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melvincarvalhomelvincarvalho
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review pass-2 fix (#573): hash-check payload for falsy-parsed bodies too
Copilot pass-2 (separate from the Buffer fix): the `if (payloadTag && request.body)` guard skipped payload validation when a JSON body parsed to a falsy value (null/false/0/""), so a client could sign a payload tag, send a falsy body, and the integrity check silently didn't run. Guard on `request.body !== undefined` instead — Fastify leaves body undefined only when no body was sent — so falsy-but-present bodies are still verified while genuinely bodyless requests stay skipped. New test: a `false` body with a WRONG payload tag is now rejected (was skipped), and with the correct tag passes. 8/8 in file; full suite green.
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‎src/auth/nostr.js‎

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@@ -243,7 +243,12 @@ export async function verifyNostrAuth(request) {
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// Validate payload hash if present and request has body
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const payloadTag = getTagValue(event, 'payload');
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if (payloadTag && request.body) {
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// Validate whenever a payload tag is present AND a body was provided —
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// keyed on `!== undefined`, not truthiness, so a JSON body that parses
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// to a falsy value (`null`, `false`, `0`, `""`) is still hash-checked
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// rather than silently skipping the integrity guard (Copilot review on
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// #573). Fastify leaves request.body `undefined` when no body was sent.
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if (payloadTag && request.body !== undefined) {
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// Hash the EXACT bytes the client signed. NIP-98's `payload` tag is
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// sha256(request body) over the wire bytes. crypto.update() accepts a
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// string (encoded UTF-8) or a Buffer (raw bytes), so we pass each

‎test/nip98-payload-hash.test.js‎

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@@ -134,6 +134,23 @@ describe('NIP-98 payload hash uses the raw request bytes (#565)', () => {
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`compact body should still pass; got error: ${result.error}`);
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});
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it('a falsy JSON body (false) is still hash-checked, not skipped (Copilot review on #573)', async () => {
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// The body literally parses to `false`. A WRONG payload tag must still
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// be caught — under the old `&& request.body` truthiness guard this
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// validation was skipped entirely for falsy bodies.
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const falsyRaw = 'false';
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const wrongToken = nip98Token(url, 'PUT', sk, 'a-different-body');
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const mismatch = await verifyNostrAuth(mockRequest(wrongToken, { rawBody: falsyRaw, body: false }));
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assert.strictEqual(mismatch.error, 'Payload hash mismatch',
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'a falsy body with a wrong payload tag must be rejected, not skipped');
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// And the matching payload for the same falsy body passes.
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const goodToken = nip98Token(url, 'PUT', sk, falsyRaw);
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const ok = await verifyNostrAuth(mockRequest(goodToken, { rawBody: falsyRaw, body: false }));
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assert.notStrictEqual(ok.error, 'Payload hash mismatch',
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`a falsy body with the correct payload should pass; got ${ok.error}`);
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});
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it('a binary / non-UTF-8 Buffer body hashes the raw bytes (Copilot review on #573)', async () => {
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// Bytes that are NOT valid UTF-8 — a .toString() round-trip would
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// mangle them (replacement chars) and break the hash. The client

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