GHA: Update dependency wolfSSL/wolfssl to v5.9.2#22160
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Analysis of PR #22160 at 1f1ee690: Test 311 failed, which has NOT been flaky recently, so there could be a real issue in this PR. Note that this test has failed in 36 different CI jobs (the link just goes to one of them). Generated by Testclutch |
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Curios test 311 errors... |
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It's a test for wrong |
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Fix proposal in #22175 |
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This PR contains the following updates:
5.9.1→5.9.2Release Notes
wolfSSL/wolfssl (wolfSSL/wolfssl)
v5.9.2Compare Source
Release 5.9.2 has been developed according to wolfSSL's development and QA
process (see link below) and successfully passed the quality criteria.
https://www.wolfssl.com/about/wolfssl-software-development-process-quality-assurance
NOTE:
dilithium.hheader andwc_dilithium_*names remain available through a temporary compatibility shim.CheckOcspResponderChain()fallback, which authorized any OCSP responder cert issued by an ancestor of the target's issuer; RFC 6960 4.2.2.2 requires direct issuance by the CA identified in the request. Also removes the now-unusedWOLFSSL_NO_OCSP_ISSUER_CHAIN_CHECKmacro and thevpparameter fromCheckOcspResponder().PR stands for Pull Request, and PR references a GitHub pull request number where the code change was added.
Vulnerabilities
[High] CVE-2026-11310
X.509 trust-chain bypass in the OpenSSL compatibility certificate verifier (wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert()).
This affects only builds with --enable-opensslextra (OPENSSL_EXTRA) and whose application validates certificates by calling X509_verify_cert() (OpenSSL compatibility layer function) with caller-supplied untrusted intermediate certificates; for those users it is critical, otherwise the library is unaffected. In particular, native wolfSSL TLS/DTLS usage is not impacted.
wolfSSL’s X509_verify_cert() temporarily loads each caller-supplied untrusted intermediate into the certificate manager but failed to drop them before the trusted-store check, so an untrusted intermediate could anchor the path itself. An attacker can present a chain that never reaches a configured trust anchor and have it accepted, resulting in acceptance of an attacker-controlled certificate.
This is certificate verification independent of TLS (e.g. S/MIME/CMS, code/firmware signing, JWT/JWS x5c), is not specific to any key type or algorithm, and a single untrusted intermediate suffices. The default wolfSSL TLS handshake (WOLFSSL_VERIFY_PEER) is not affected; only TLS applications doing manual or deferred peer verification through this API are, which also requires --enable-sessioncerts. Affected: v5.8.4, v5.9.0 and v5.9.1 (introduced by commit
025dbc3); v5.8.2 and earlier are not. Thanks to Corban Villa, Sohee Kim and Austin Chu (UC Berkeley, Sky Lab). Fixed in PR 10674.[High] CVE-2026-11999
X.509 trust-chain bypass (path-depth exhaustion) in the OpenSSL compatibility certificate verifier (wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert()). This affects only builds with --enable-opensslextra whose application calls X509_verify_cert() with caller-supplied untrusted intermediates; for those users it is critical, otherwise the library is unaffected. Native wolfSSL TLS/DTLS usage is not impacted.
X509_verify_cert() returned success based only on the last verified link rather than on reaching a trust anchor: when the supplied chain is deeper than the verifier's maximum path depth (default 100), path building runs out of depth while still walking untrusted intermediates and the chain is accepted even though it never reaches a configured trust anchor, allowing acceptance of an attacker-controlled certificate. The default TLS handshake (WOLFSSL_VERIFY_PEER) is not affected; only applications doing manual or deferred verification through this API are. Affected versions: v5.7.4 through v5.9.1, introduced in commit
17c9e92(first released in v5.7.4); v5.7.2 and earlier are not affected. Thanks to Corban Villa, Sohee Kim and Austin Chu (UC Berkeley, Sky Lab). Fixed in PR 10674.[High] CVE-2026-6679
A heap buffer overflow could occur in the DTLS 1.3 ACK serialization path before the connecting peer is authenticated. The buffer overflow was due to an integer truncation when computing the length of the ACK record-number list, causing an undersized buffer to be allocated and then overrun. This affects builds using DTLS 1.3 and wolfSSL version 5.9.0 and earlier. A fix was added to the 5.9.1 release. Thanks to Nicholas Carlini from Anthropic for the report. Fixed in PR 10116.
[High] CVE-2026-55958
Out-of-bounds write in the Renesas TSIP TLS 1.3 transcript buffer. In tsip_StoreMessage() the capacity check guarding the fixed message bag (MSGBAG_SIZE) sets an error code but fails to return, so execution falls through to an XMEMCPY that writes past the end of the buffer once the accumulated TLS 1.3 handshake transcript exceeds MSGBAG_SIZE (8 KB), corrupting adjacent heap state and potentially causing a remote denial of service crash. The bag is sized to hold a normal handshake, so this is reached only by an unusually large but valid certificate chain, or by a malicious or man-in-the-middle server sending an oversized handshake message to a client that does not strictly verify the chain. This only affects builds using the Renesas TSIP TLS port (WOLFSSL_RENESAS_TSIP_TLS) as a TLS 1.3 client on Renesas MCUs with TSIP hardware enabled, and is rated High within those builds. All other configurations are unaffected. Thanks to NVIDIA Project Vanessa for the report. Fixed in PR 10705.
[High] CVE-2026-55960
Un-negotiated Raw Public Key (RFC 7250) accepted in place of an X.509 certificate, bypassing chain validation. A raw public key has no chain, so ParseCertRelative() accepts it without performing any trust verification; it must therefore only be accepted when RPK was actually negotiated for that peer. The check now defaults the expected type to X.509 (per RFC 7250/8446) when no type was negotiated, comparing against the received server certificate type on the client and the selected client certificate type on the server, and rejects any mismatch, including an un-negotiated raw public key, with UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE. Only affects builds with Raw Public Key support (HAVE_RPK) enabled - disabled by default in a standalone build, but included in --enable-all. Thanks to NVIDIA Project Vanessa for the report. Fixed in PR 10702.
[High] CVE-2026-55961
wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify() returning success for a degenerate (certs-only) PKCS#7 object that contains no signer. Such an object has empty signerInfos, so the underlying signed-data verification succeeds without authenticating any content. The compatibility-layer verify path now rejects the object when no signer signature has actually been verified, so a PKCS#7 carrying no valid signature is no longer reported as verified. This is enforced regardless of the PKCS7_NOVERIFY flag, which only suppresses signer certificate chain validation and was never intended to waive the requirement that a signature exist. Only affects OpenSSL compatibility builds that call the PKCS7_verify() compatibility API on potentially degenerate PKCS#7 bundles. Thanks to NVIDIA Project Vanessa for the report. Fixed in PR 10702.
[Med] CVE-2026-6731
X.509 name constraint bypass via the Subject Common Name when treated as a DNS-type name. A certificate whose Subject CN violates an issuing CA's DNS name constraints could be accepted. Thanks to d0sf3t (Aradex) for the report. Fixed in PR 10223.
[Med] CVE-2026-6091
Partial-chain certificate verification may accept chains that terminate at a peer-supplied, untrusted intermediate certificate rather than a trusted anchor. An attacker could present a chain that ends at an intermediate they control and have it accepted as valid. Thanks to Dikai Zou for the report. Fixed in PR 10170.
[Med] CVE-2026-6094
Heap buffer overread in wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData when parsing crafted PKCS7 EnvelopedData. This could theoretically be triggered by attacker-supplied data delivered via S/MIME or CMS. Thanks to Dikai Zou for the report. Fixed in PR 10128.
[Med] CVE-2026-6329
PKCS#12 MAC verification uses an attacker-controlled comparison length, weakening the integrity check on the MAC and allowing a mismatched MAC to be accepted. Thanks to Nicholas Carlini from Anthropic for the report. Fixed in PR 10192.
[Med] CVE-2026-6330
The ML-KEM ARM64 NEON ciphertext comparison only compares half of the input, breaking the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform's implicit rejection and weakening IND-CCA2 security on that code path. Thanks to Nicholas Carlini from Anthropic for the report. Fixed in PR 10192.
[Med] CVE-2026-8720
wc_Blake2bHmacFinal and wc_Blake2sHmacFinal discard the message when the key length exceeds the block size, producing a MAC that is independent of the input. This bug is specific to the HMAC-BLAKE2 API’s that were added in wolfSSL version 5.9.0. Fixed in PR 10447.
[Med] CVE-2026-10097
ML-KEM-1024 x64 AVX2 implicit rejection failure in the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform breaks IND-CCA2 security, allowing decapsulation to deviate from the implicit-rejection behavior required by the standard. Thanks to 007bsd for the report. Fixed in PR 10430.
[Med] CVE-2026-10098
OCSP CertID serial-number length-confusion in wolfSSL_OCSP_resp_find_status allows a same-issuer SingleResponse whose serial is a prefix of the target serial to be reported as the revocation status of a different certificate. Thanks to Kim Youngjoon (Team-Atlanta and Georgia Institute of Technology) for the report. Fixed in PR 10554.
[Med] CVE-2026-10592
Certificates with wildcard DNS SANs (e.g. *.example.com) bypassed CA name-constraint checks. Thanks to tonghuaroot for the report. Fixed in PR 10549.
[Med] CVE-2026-7532
iPAddress name constraints bypass when WOLFSSL_IP_ALT_NAME is not defined. IP address name constraints are not enforced in that configuration, allowing a certificate to bypass an issuing CA's IP address constraints. Thanks to Ankur Tyagi of Cisco Talos (TALOS-2026-2409) for the report. Fixed in PR 10354.
[Med] CVE-2026-6291
Bleichenbacher padding oracle in PKCS#7 KTRI decryption. When decrypting PKCS#7 EnvelopedData using RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 key transport, wolfSSL returned distinguishable error codes depending on whether RSA padding validation failed versus whether the decrypted content was malformed. An attacker able to submit crafted EnvelopedData messages and observe error responses could use this as a padding oracle to incrementally recover the encrypted Content Encryption Key (CEK). The fix generates a deterministic pseudo-random fake CEK on padding failure (via HMAC-SHA256) and proceeds with decryption identically, using constant-time operations throughout, so that all failure paths produce the same error regardless of padding validity. Found with internal wolfSSL review. Fixed in PR 10203.
[Med] CVE-2026-7511
PKCS7_verify signer confusion allows forged signatures, where the signer associated with a signature is not correctly bound, permitting a forged signature to be accepted. Thanks to Nicholas Carlini from Anthropic for the report. Fixed in PR 10203.
[Med] CVE-2026-11703
Fixed missing SNI/ALPN binding on stateful (session-ID) resumption, which previously skipped the binding check performed for ticket-based resumption. A cached session could be resumed under a different SNI/ALPN than originally negotiated and, where client-authentication policy differs across virtual hosts, carry the cached peer-authentication state into a context it was not established for. Resumption now verifies the SNI/ALPN binding for all paths and declines (falling back to a full handshake) on mismatch. Thanks to Dikai Zou for the report. Fixed in PR 10489.
[Med] CVE-2026-55962
TLS 1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA) issue where a server could accept a client's Finished message without the client having sent a Certificate and CertificateVerify. The post-handshake-auth exemption that allows an empty/absent peer certificate was only intended for the initial handshake, but it was also being applied while a post-handshake CertificateRequest was still outstanding. The check is now scoped to the initial handshake only: on the server, once a post-handshake CertificateRequest has been sent (certReqCtx is set), a peer certificate and a valid CertificateVerify are required again before the Finished is accepted, with empty-certificate handling following the configured verify mode (FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) just as during first-handshake client authentication. Only affects TLS 1.3 servers built with post-handshake authentication support (WOLFSSL_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH / --enable-postauth, included in --enable-all) that enable WOLFSSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE and request a client certificate after the handshake via wolfSSL_request_certificate(). Clients, and servers that do not use post-handshake authentication, are unaffected. Thanks to NVIDIA Project Vanessa for the report. Fixed in PR 10702.
[Med] CVE-2026-55964
Chain intermediate CA:TRUE without keyCertSign accepted as a signing CA. Intermediate CA certificates are required to have the keyCertSign key usage when a Key Usage extension is present, but chain-supplied temporary CAs (WOLFSSL_TEMP_CA) added while building a certificate path were previously exempted from this check, so an intermediate asserting CA:TRUE but lacking keyCertSign was accepted as a signing CA. The check now applies to chain-supplied temporary CAs as well; only operator-loaded root certificates (WOLFSSL_USER_CA) and self-signed roots remain exempt. Per RFC 5280 an absent Key Usage extension implies all usages, so the requirement is enforced only when the extension is actually present (extKeyUsageSet). Affects the OpenSSL-compatibility certificate-path-building path (X509_verify_cert / X509_STORE, OPENSSL_EXTRA/OPENSSL_ALL), where untrusted chain intermediates are added as temporary CAs; native (non-OpenSSL-compat) certificate verification does not create temporary CAs and is unaffected. Within those builds, the check applies unless ALLOW_INVALID_CERTSIGN is defined. Thanks to NVIDIA Project Vanessa for the report. Fixed in PR 10702.
[Low] CVE-2026-6092
When HAVE_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC is configured, the implementation could fall back to MAC-then-Encrypt rather than enforcing Encrypt-then-MAC. Thanks to Marcin Olejnik (Rockwell Automation) for the report. Fixed in PR 10167.
[Low] CVE-2026-6331
HMAC zero-length tag forgery in EVP_DigestVerifyFinal, where a zero-length tag could be accepted as valid during HMAC verification. Thanks to Nicholas Carlini from Anthropic for the report. Fixed in PR 10192.
[Low] CVE-2026-6681
The PKCS#7 decode path ignores the caller-supplied output buffer size (outputSz), allowing decoded content to be written past the bounds of the provided buffer. This affects wolfSSL 5.9.0 and earlier and was fixed in the 5.9.1 release. Thanks to Nicholas Carlini from Anthropic for the report. Fixed in PR 10116.
[Low] CVE-2026-10512
The X25519 x86_64 assembly implementation fails to clear the most significant bit during the final modular reduction, so the computed result may not be fully reduced modulo the field prime 2^255 - 19. This can leave the field element in a non-canonical form, producing an incorrect result from the scalar multiplication and potentially a wrong shared secret. Thanks to Haruki Oyama for the report. Fixed in PR 10536.
[Low] CVE-2026-6678
Integer underflow in wc_PKCS7_DecryptOri when handling crafted Other Recipient Info, leading to incorrect length handling during decryption. Thanks to Dikai Zou for the report. Fixed in PR 10203.
[Low] CVE-2026-7531
Use-after-free in PQC hybrid key-share handling. This is an incomplete-fix follow-up to CVE-2026-5460 (released in 5.9.1): a malicious TLS 1.3 server sending a truncated PQC hybrid KeyShare can still trigger the error cleanup path to operate on freed memory. Thanks to Thai Duong (Calif.io / Anthropic) for the report. Fixed in PR 10327.
[Low] CVE-2026-6325
Out-of-bounds write in SetSuitesHashSigAlgo when processing an oversized signature algorithms list, allowing a write past the bounds of the destination buffer. Thanks to Muhammad Arya Arjuna Habibullah (Pelioro) for the report. Fixed in PR 10204.
[Low] CVE-2026-6412
Certificate policy and RFC 8446 compliance concerns regarding the continued acceptance of SHA-1/MD5 in certificate processing. Thanks to Xiangdong Li (Student, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications [BUPT]) for the report. Fixed in PR 10222.
[Low] CVE-2026-6450
A CRL critical extension bypass exists in ParseCRL_Extensions where critical extensions are not properly enforced, allowing a crafted CRL with an unhandled critical extension to be accepted. This only affects builds with CRL support enabled and where a crafted CRL had a trusted signature when parsed. Thanks to Oleh Konko (@1seal) for the report. Fixed in PR 10239.
[Low] CVE-2026-12340
Out-of-bounds heap read during SM2/SM3 certificate signature verification. When parsing a certificate with an SM3wSM2 signature, the Subject Key Identifier computation reads the trailing 65 bytes of the public key without checking that the key is at least that long. A public key shorter than 65 bytes results in an out-of-bounds heap read, leading to a potential crash (denial of service); there is no out-of-bounds write. Note this only affects builds with SM2 support (--enable-sm2 or --enable-all). Thanks to David Pokora, Trail of Bits (in collaboration with Anthropic). Fixed in PR 10641.
[Low] CVE-2026-55967
AES-GCM encryption/decryption with extremely large cumulative single message sizes (>64 GiB) were not properly rejected by the streaming APIs, allowing counter wrap, keystream reuse, and consequent plaintext recovery. Thanks to NVIDIA Project Vanessa for the report. Fixed in PR 10709.
Enhancements
BREAKING (FIPS 205 SLH-DSA):
wc_SlhDsaKey_SignHash,wc_SlhDsaKey_SignHashDeterministic,wc_SlhDsaKey_SignHashWithRandom, andwc_SlhDsaKey_VerifyHashnow take the caller-pre-hashed message digest viahash/hashSzparameters (renamed frommsg/msgSz), aligned with ML-DSA'swc_dilithium_sign_ctx_hash/wc_dilithium_verify_ctx_hashsemantics, and NIST ACVPsignatureInterface=external/preHash=preHashtest vectors.hashSzmust equalwc_HashGetDigestSize(hashType)(32 bytes for SHAKE128, 64 bytes for SHAKE256 per FIPS 205 Section 10.2.2); otherwiseBAD_LENGTH_Eis returned. Migration: hash the message yourself before the call (callers using positional arguments are source-compatible; only the parameter names changed). Caveat: callers who today pass a raw message whose length happens to equal the digest size for the chosenhashType(e.g., signing a 32-byte handle/IV/seed withWC_HASH_TYPE_SHA256) will not tripBAD_LENGTH_E; the resulting signature is syntactically valid but is over the wrong bytes. The pre-existingwc_SlhDsaKey_SignMsgDeterministicandwc_SlhDsaKey_SignMsgWithRandomretain their M'-supplied-directly contract (FIPS 205 internal interface, Algorithm 19); their input validation is hardened with the same NULL/length/MISSING_KEYchecks as the*Hash*family.wc_SlhDsaKey_VerifyMsgis unchanged. All three gain doxygen coverage. (PR 10450, PR 10465)Behavioral change (RSA-PSS trailerField enforcement):
DecodeRsaPssParams(and its public wrapper
wc_DecodeRsaPssParams) now enforces RFC 8017 A.2.3,which mandates
trailerField == trailerFieldBC(1). In the default build(i.e., without
WOLFSSL_NO_ASN_STRICT), any certificate or CMS/PKCS#7structure whose RSA-PSS parameters contain a
trailerFieldvalue other than 1is now rejected with
ASN_PARSE_E. Previously, any positive integer value wassilently accepted. This affects all call paths that decode RSA-PSS algorithm
parameters, including X.509 certificate parsing and PKCS#7 signature
verification. Users who need to interoperate with non-conformant peers can
define
WOLFSSL_NO_ASN_STRICTto restore the previous permissive behavior. (PR 10595)Renamed the post-quantum signature implementation from its pre-standardization name Dilithium to its NIST-standardized name ML-DSA (FIPS 204), mirroring the earlier Kyber -> ML-KEM rename in
wc_mlkem.{h,c}. The legacy<wolfssl/wolfcrypt/dilithium.h>header,dilithium_keytype,wc_dilithium_*/wc_Dilithium_*functions, andHAVE_DILITHIUM/WOLFSSL_DILITHIUM_*/WC_DILITHIUM_*build gates remain available through a temporary compatibility shim, so application code keeps compiling unchanged. See doc/dilithium-to-mldsa-migration.md for the full list of renamed symbols, the newWOLFSSL_MLDSAcmake option /--enable-mldsaconfigure switch, and the migration steps for moving consumer code to the canonical API. (PR 10436, PR 10497, PR 10516)TLS 1.3: zero traffic key staging buffers in
SetKeysSide()once a CryptoCB callback has imported the AES key into a Secure Element (aes->devCtx != NULL). Clearskeys->{client,server}_write_keyon the provisioned side(s) after cipher init succeeds. The static IV buffers (keys->{client,server}_write_IV,keys->aead_{enc,dec}_imp_IV) are intentionally left intact becauseBuildTls13Nonce()reads them on every AEAD record to construct the per-record nonce. Scoped to TLS 1.3, non-DTLS, non-QUIC; requiresWOLF_CRYPTO_CBandWOLF_CRYPTO_CB_AES_SETKEY. (PR 10246)The
wc_AesCmacVerify/_exAPI were hardened to more closely conform toNIST SP 800-38B MAC length guidance, and these verify functions will now
correctly enforce bounds on tag length checks. As a result, Cmac verification
that previously were erroneously passing will now return
MAC_CMP_FAILED_Eor
BAD_FUNC_ARG. (PR 10462)New Features
wc_PufInit/wc_PufEnroll/wc_PufReconstruct). by @dgarske (PR 10066)WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_SETKEYandWOLF_CRYPTO_CB_EXPORT_KEYgeneric crypto callbacks to bridge raw key bytes to and from hardware key stores. by @night1rider (PR 9851)wc_InitCmac_Id/_Label,wc_AesNew_Id/_Label,wc_NewRsaKey_Id/_Label) so algorithms can forward a hardware key-slot identifier. by @night1rider (PR 10072)WOLFSSL_SP_NONBLOCKto RSA and Diffie-Hellman for the C/Small 2048/3072/4096 backends so handshakes never block for long on a single big-integer operation. by @dgarske (PR 10394)--enable-wolfzfssupport for the wolfCrypt OpenZFS patch in both kernel-space and user-space builds. by @philljj (PR 10397)WOLFSSL_DTLS_ONLYand an--enable-dtls13autoconf cascade. by @julek-wolfssl (PR 10353)--enable-context-extra-user-dataex_data index limit to 9999 and increased external cookie/extra-user-data maximum sizes for large-scale deployments. by @Roy-Carter (PR 10236)SECURITY-POLICY.md,SECURITY-REPORT-TEMPLATE.md). by @ColtonWilley (PR 10284)BIO_get_init, and short-form alert string helpers. by @Roy-Carter (PR 10158, PR 10160)Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)
MakeKey/Sign/Verify/SigsLeft) and id/label support for LMS and XMSS. by @padelsbach (PR 10380)WOLFSSL_MLKEM_DYNAMIC_KEYS) to right-size key buffers and reduce handshake memory use on constrained systems. by @Frauschi (PR 10179, PR 10206)WOLFSSL_DILITHIUM_DYNAMIC_KEYS). by @Frauschi (PR 10180)X509_get_pubkeyandEVP_PKEY_base_id. by @kojo1 (PR 9965)d2i_PUBKEY/d2i_PrivateKey,EVP_PKCS82PKEY, andX509_check_private_key. by @cconlon (PR 10310, PR 10483)Ed25519/Ed448 support to the EVP_PKEY layer and fixed a d2i key-probe bug affecting RSA/ECC/DH. by @lealem47 (PR 10135)WC_DILITHIUM_CACHE_MATRIX_Ais enabled. by @embhorn (PR 10400)TLS/DTLS
wolfSSL_CTX_GenerateEchConfigEx()API. by @sebastian-carpenter (PR 10326)wolfSSL_CTX_SetEchEnableTrialDecrypt()) and ECH connection-status reporting. by @sebastian-carpenter (PR 10469)preferredGroup[0]viaWOLFSSL_KEY_SHARE_DEFAULT_GROUPto reduce HelloRetryRequests. by @Frauschi (PR 10435)WOLFSSL_DTLS13_5_9_0_COMPATcompatibility mode for interoperating with pre-5.9.0 DTLS 1.3 clients. by @rizlik (PR 10492)WOLFSSL_QUIC_MAX_RECORD_CAPACITYcheck on the QUIC early-data path. by @gasbytes (PR 10201)WOLFSSL_MAX_SIGALGOto 128. by @julek-wolfssl (PR 10528)ASN and Certificate Parsing
WOLFSSL_X509_STORE_ALLOW_NON_CA_INTERMEDIATEfor backward compatibility. by @embhorn (PR 10339)IsValidFQDN()helper. by @douzzer (PR 10183, PR 10419)wc_SignatureGetSize()from>=to exact equality. by @miyazakh (PR 10122)wolfSSL_X509_set_authority_key_id(). by @cconlon (PR 10370)wolfSSL_PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL. by @julek-wolfssl (PR 10336)wolfSSL_EC_POINT_hex2point. Thanks to breakingbad6, Yanzhao Shen, and Yingpei Zeng (Hangzhou Dianzi University). by @embhorn (PR 10445)Hardware and Embedded Ports
WOLFSSL_ARMASMis set. by @dgarske (PR 10311)NO_ASN_TIMEwhenXTIMEis defined. by @lealem47 (PR 10295)SE050_RSA_NO_VERIFY/SE050_ECDSA_NO_VERIFY/SE050_ECDSA_NO_ECDHEoptions and simulator CI. by @rizlik (PR 10219)XINET_PTON(MQX RTCS support, IPv6 buffer sizing). by @josepho0918 (PR 10075)hashTypein port hash implementations so SHA-512 modes can be distinguished. by @padelsbach (PR 10193)CRYPTOCB_UNAVAILABLE. by @padelsbach (PR 10456)Rust Wrapper
Build System and Portability
<stddef.h>behindNO_STDDEF_Hand userspace fcntl/filesystem code behindWOLFSSL_KERNEL_MODE. by @philljj (PR 10280, PR 10521)--enable-opensslextrawithNO_BIOandNO_FILESYSTEM. by @JacobBarthelmeh (PR 10393)--enable-writedupwhen DTLS is disabled. by @mattia-moffa (PR 10527)WOLFSSL_USE_ALIGNautomatically for ARM user_settings.h builds. by @embhorn (PR 10487)WC_LINUXKM_USE_HEAP_WRAPPERSheap wrappers and AES-CCM LKCAPI shims for the Linux kernel module. by @douzzer (PR 10512, PR 10194)WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_ONLY_*test infrastructure (SHA-256, SHA-224, AES). by @rizlik (PR 10351, PR 10500)WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_RSA_PAD. by @kareem-wolfssl (PR 10428)WOLFSSL_AES_SMALL_TABLES. by @embhorn (PR 10366)--enable-leantlsbuilds. by @miyazakh (PR 10510)Bug Fixes
SizeASN_Items. by @anhu (PR 10051)O_CLOEXECat file creation to harden against multithread races. by @embhorn (PR 10162)secure_renegotiationpointer afterTLSX_FreeAll. by @ColtonWilley (PR 10210)wc_AesGcmDecryptFinal. by @yosuke-wolfssl (PR 10175)sakke_hash_to_range, plus awc_export_intsize check. by @JeremiahM37 (PR 10442) and @philljj (PR 10444)PKCS7_VerifySignedDatato prevent out-of-bounds access. Thanks to Feng Ning / Innora. by @padelsbach (PR 10441)wolfSSL_X509_set_ext. by @padelsbach (PR 10481)TLSX_KeyShare_ProcessPqcHybridClientagainst double free and wrong-key NULLing. by @embhorn (PR 10327) and @kareem-wolfssl (PR 10493)NO_VERIFY_OIDbuild inGetOID. Thanks to @cpsource. by @JeremiahM37 (PR 10440)WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK. by @Frauschi (PR 10245)Documentation and Maintenance
BN_bn2binpadAPI. by @julek-wolfssl (PR 10148)Configuration
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